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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 Alberto Torres pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute cocaine and distribution of 
five kilograms or more of cocaine. A loaded handgun was found in Torres’ apartment. 
The District Court concluded the gun was connected to the conspiracy, increased Torres’ 
offense level by two under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1), and denied his motion for a two-level 
decrease under the safety valve provision found at U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2. We will affirm. 
I. 
Torres was a member of a drug distribution conspiracy that distributed between 
150 and 200 kilograms of cocaine from 2007 to 2010. In March 2007, Torres and co-
defendant Jaime Duran met with a cooperating defendant, KW, in St. Louis, Missouri. 
Torres and Duran agreed to supply KW, who was from Philadelphia, with cocaine. 
Torres, who was from California, was designated the East Coast representative for the 
conspiracy and rented an apartment in Bear, Delaware, later moving to Wilmington. 
Torres supplied KW with cocaine by storing the cocaine in his car and exchanging 
vehicles with KW. KW was arrested in early 2009. 
After KW’s arrest, Duran contacted KW’s wife in an attempt to collect money for 
cocaine supplied to KW. The FBI sent in a cooperating informant (“CI”) who pretended 
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to be KW’s cousin. Torres met CI and an undercover FBI agent at a Delaware parking 
lot, and Torres placed a Home Depot storage box containing 23.94 kilograms of cocaine 
into the undercover agent’s vehicle. Two days later, Torres and his co-conspirators were 
arrested. 
Torres gave the FBI permission to search his apartment in Wilmington. Agents 
recovered a loaded .45 caliber pistol and box of ammunition, both hidden underneath a 
sofa cushion in a bedroom. Torres admitted that the pistol was his, and it is undisputed he 
owned the pistol legally. Agents also recovered Sharpies, rubber bands, latex gloves, and 
trash bags, which the government contends are drug packaging materials. 
Torres pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute cocaine (21 U.S.C. § 846) and 
distribution of five kilograms or more of cocaine (21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)). At 
sentencing, Torres objected to a two-level increase to his offense level under U.S.S.G. § 
2D1.1(b)(1), which applies “[i]f a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was 
possessed.” Torres argued he owned the gun for personal protection and that it had no 
connection to the drug conspiracy. There was no evidence Torres ever carried the gun 
during any drug transaction. The District Court denied the objection. 
Torres also argued he was eligible for a two-level reduction under the safety valve 
provision, U.S.S.G. §§ 2D1.1(b)(16) and 5C1.2. To be eligible for the safety valve, 
Torres must not have possessed a weapon in connection with the drug trafficking offense. 
The court concluded Torres did not meet this requirement not only because the gun was 
possessed in an apartment that Torres only had as part of the drug conspiracy, but also 
because items that could be used to package drugs were found nearby. The court 
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sentenced Torres to 180 months’ imprisonment, varying down from the Guideline range 
of 210-262 months. Torres appeals.
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II. 
Torres contends the District Court erred by applying the two-level increase to his 
offense level under § 2D1.1(b)(1). He argues the government was required to prove a 
connection between the firearm and the drug trafficking offense and that the government 
failed to meet its burden because there was no evidence he ever carried the gun during 
any transaction or that any drugs were ever stored or packaged in the apartment where the 
firearm was kept.  
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 provides the base levels and enhancements for drug trafficking 
crimes. Section 2D1.1(b)(1) states: “If a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was 
possessed, increase by 2 levels.” The Application Note explains “[t]he enhancement 
should be applied if the weapon was present, unless it is clearly improbable that the 
weapon was connected with the offense. For example, the enhancement would not be 
applied if the defendant, arrested at the defendant’s residence, had an unloaded hunting 
rifle in the closet.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 cmt. n.11.2 
The weapons enhancement will apply if the government proves that the firearm 
was present during the offense, and that it is not “clearly improbable that the weapon was 
connected with the offense.”  United States v. Thornton, 306 F.3d 1355, 1357 (3d Cir. 
                                              
1
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742. 
2
 In the 2011 version of the Guidelines, under which Torres was sentenced, this 
explanation is located in Application Note 3.  
5 
 
2002) (quotation omitted).To meet the first step, “the prosecution need only prove that 
the defendant possessed the weapon during the currency of the offense, not necessarily 
that he actually used it in perpetrating the crime or that he intended to do so.” United 
States v. McDonald, 121 F.3d 7, 10 (1st Cir. 1997); see also United States v. Zavalza-
Rodriguez, 379 F.3d 1182, 1185 (10th Cir. 2004) (requiring “a temporal and spatial 
relation . . . between the weapon, the drug trafficking activity, and the defendant” 
(quotation omitted)). To determine whether it was not “clearly improbable” that the 
firearm was connected to the offense, we consider (1) “the type of gun involved, with 
clear improbability less likely with handguns than with hunting rifles”; (2) “whether the 
gun was loaded”; (3) “whether the gun was stored near the drugs or drug paraphernalia”; 
and (4) “whether the gun was accessible.” United States v. Drozdowski, 313 F.3d 819, 
822-23 (3d Cir. 2002). We review the application of the enhancement for clear error. 
United States v. Manigan, 592 F.3d 621, 631 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Cooper, 
274 F.3d 230, 245 (5th Cir. 2001) (“This is a factual finding and thus reviewed for clear 
error.”).  
Torres’ challenge focuses on the first step. He argues there is no evidence the gun 
was “present” during any drug trafficking because he never carried it during any 
transaction and no trafficking activity took place in the apartment. But Torres participated 
in a years-long conspiracy. The conspiracy was based in California and Torres kept the 
Delaware apartment solely for the purpose of facilitating the conspiracy. He only 
travelled to Delaware to distribute drugs. The District Court could reasonably infer the 
apartment was a key locus of the conspiracy and thus the gun had “a temporal and spatial 
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relation” to the conspiracy. Zavalza-Rodriguez, 379 F.3d at 1185 (quotation omitted). 
Under the four factors of Drozdowski, it is not clearly improbable the gun was 
connected to the offense. The gun was a handgun and was loaded. And being stored 
under a couch cushion made it easily accessible. Accordingly, we see no clear error.
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III. 
 Torres also challenges the court’s denial of his motion for a two-level decrease in 
offense level under the safety valve provision of U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(16). That provision 
applies if the defendant meets the five criteria of U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a): (1) the defendant 
does not have more than one criminal history point; (2) the defendant did not use 
violence or possess a dangerous weapon “in connection with the offense”; (3) the offense 
did not result in death or serious bodily injury; (4) the defendant did not have a leadership 
role in the offense; and (5) the defendant truthfully provided all information about the 
offense to the government. The District Court rejected Torres’ motion based on the 
second requirement, finding he “possessed the gun in . . . connection” with the drug 
conspiracy. Our review is for clear error. United States v. Richards, 674 F.3d 215, 219-
220 (3d Cir. 2012). For the reasons discussed above, we will not upset the court’s 
finding. 
IV. 
                                              
3
 Torres argues the District Court interpreted the Guideline to only require possession of 
the firearm, and thus never made the necessary finding of a connection between the gun 
and the conspiracy when ruling on the § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement. Even if so, the court 
found Torres possessed the firearm in connection with the conspiracy when ruling on the 
safety valve provision, a finding that satisfies the government’s burden under § 
2D1.1(b)(1). See United States v. Agnew, 407 F.3d 193, 196 (3d Cir. 2005) (“We may 
affirm on any ground supported by the record.”).  
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 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment and sentence of the District 
Court. 
